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Abstract
Modeling social interactions based on individual behavior has al-
ways been an area of interest, but prior literature generally presumes
rational behavior. Thus, such models may miss out on capturing the ef-
fects of biases humans are susceptible to. This work presents a method
to model egocentric bias, the real-life tendency to emphasize one’s own
opinion heavily when presented with multiple opinions. We use a sym-
metric distribution centered at an agent’s own opinion, as opposed to
the Bounded Confidence (BC) model used in prior work. We consider
a game of iterated interactions where an agent cooperates based on
its opinion about an opponent. Our model also includes the concept
of domain-based self-doubt, which varies as the interaction succeeds
or not. An increase in doubt makes an agent reduce its egocentricity
in subsequent interactions, thus enabling the agent to learn reactively.
The agent system is modeled with factions not having a single leader,
to overcome some of the issues associated with leader-follower factions.
We find that agents belonging to factions perform better than individ-
ual agents. We observe that an intermediate level of egocentricity helps
the agent perform at its best, which concurs with conventional wisdom
that neither overconfidence nor low self-esteem brings benefits.
Keywords: egocentric bias; cognitive psychology; doubt; factions; Contin-
uous Prisoner’s Dilemma; opinion aggregation
1 Introduction
Decision making has been a long-studied topic in the domain of social agent-
based systems, but most earlier models were rudimentary and assumed ratio-
nal behavior [56, 19]. Decision making is strongly driven by the opinion that
an agent holds; this opinion is shaped over time by its own initial perceptions
[44], its view of the world [18], information it receives over various channels,
and its own memory [20]. This process of opinion formation is fairly com-
plex even under the assumption that Bayesian reasoning applies to decision
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making. Years of research in psychology has shown that humans and even
animals [28, 10] are susceptible to a wide plethora of cognitive biases [4].
Despite the immense difficulties in the understanding and description of
opinion dynamics, it continues to be an area of immense interest because
of the profound impact of individual and societal decisions in our everyday
lives.
In this work, we model agents with egocentric bias and focus on agents’
opinion formation based on its perception, memory, and opinions from other
agents. Egocentric bias may be described as the tendency to rely too heavily
on one’s own perspective. The bias has been claimed to be ubiquitous [45]
and ineradicable [37]. Egocentric bias is commonly thought of as an umbrella
term, and covers various cognitive biases, including the anchoring bias [65,
48, 22] and the “false consensus effect” [54]. Recent research seems to suggest
that such bias is a consequence of limited cognitive ability [43] and the neural
network structure of the brain [34].
The initial approaches to model opinion dynamics were heavily inspired
by statistical physics and the concept of atomic spin states. They were thus
detached from real life and allowed only two levels of opinions [12, 63]. There
was also the social impact model [47, 46] and its further variations with a
strong leader [32].
Later models, such as the ones proposed by Krause [36] and Hegsel-
mann [30] considered continuous values for opinions and introduced the
Bounded Confidence (BC) model which incorporated the confirmation bias.
The BC model and the relative agreement model by Deffuant et al. [13]
inspired by the former, have remained in favor until now [1, 41]. Confirma-
tion bias has also been modeled in other contexts, such as trust [49] and
conversational agents [7, 29].
Historically, models concentrating on opinion dynamics have revolved
around consensus formation. However, opinions are not formed at an indi-
vidual or societal level without any consequence. Rather, these opinions lead
to decisions and these decisions have a cost, a result, and an outcome. In
reality, humans as well as animals learn from outcomes and there are subtle
changes introduced in this process of opinion formation during subsequent
interactions.
The assignment of weights to all opinions including one’s own is a major
issue in opinion formation. In the BC model, the weights are taken as a
uniform distribution within the interval, and opinions outside of this are
rejected. The problem with this model is that it is too rigid. To introduce
some level of flexibility into our model, we consider the assignment of weights
as per a symmetric distribution centered around the agent’s perspective with
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its flatness/spread varied according to that agent’s level of egocentricity.
We consider a game of iterated interactions where an agent, say A, is
paired with some random agent, say B, in one such iteration. Each of these
interactions is a Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma (CPD) [66], which allows
an agent to cooperate at various levels bounded by [0, 1]. Here, opinions are
based upon an agent’s knowledge about the opponent’s level of cooperation
in prior interactions and thus lies between 0 and 1. Thus, A has its own
opinion of B and it also takes opinions of B from other sources. A aggregates
all the opinions and cooperates at that level, and it then decides the outcome
of this interaction based on B’s level of cooperation.
Our model also captures an agent’s reaction to this outcome. When an
agent succeeds, there is a rise in self-esteem and this is reflected in a higher
egocentricity in subsequent interactions. We model reaction to failure as a
loss of self-esteem i.e., a rise in self-doubt on this domain [57]. This domain-
based self-doubt is a key aspect of this model as it helps an agent to learn
reactively.
In our model, agents can belong to factions as well. While most works
have modeled factions as a leader-followers structure [59, 2], we model a fac-
tion with a central memory, that holds the faction’s view on all agents in the
system. The faction’s view is an unbiased aggregate of individual opinions
of its members. To sum up, an agent can have up to three different levels of
information—its own opinion, opinions from friends, and the faction’s view.
Through simulation, we find results about optimum level of egocentricity
and the effect of faction sizes. Varying the levels of egocentricity among
agents, it is observed that agents with an intermediate level perform much
better than agents with either low or high levels of egocentricity. This is
in strong agreement with conventional wisdom that neither overconfidence
nor low self-confidence brings optimum results. Agents in larger factions
are observed to perform better, and results indicate a linear proportionality
between value and faction size as suggested by Sarnoff’s Law. Also, to
understand the effects of other attributes of the system, we vary the number
of interactions, the proportion of different agents, the types of agents, etc.
2 Related Work
In his work on opinion dynamics [61], Sobkowicz writes:
“Despite the undoubted advances, the sociophysical models of
the individual behaviour are still rather crude. Most of the so-
ciophysical agents and descriptions of their individual behaviour
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are too simplistic, too much ‘spin-like’, and thus unable to cap-
ture the intricacies of our behaviours.”
Our work thus focuses on three key aspects—egocentricity, self-doubt,
and the concept of factions. In this section, we review the existing work in
these domains.
Egocentric Bias
Egocentric bias is the tendency to rely too heavily on one’s own perspec-
tive and/or to have a higher opinion of oneself than others. Ralph Barton
Perry [50] coined the term egocentric predicament and described it as the
problem of not being able to view reality outside of our own perceptions.
Greenwald [26] described it as a phenomenon in which people skew their
beliefs in agreement with their perceptions or what they recall from their
memory. We are susceptible to this bias because information is better en-
coded when an agent produces information actively by being a participant
in the interaction.
Research suggests that this skewed view of reality is a virtually universal
trait and that it affects each person’s life far more significantly than had
been realized [45]. It has also been shown to be pervasive among people and
groups in various contexts such as relationships, team sports, etc. [55]. It is
closely connected to important traits such as self-esteem and confidence [38].
A high degree of egocentric bias hinders the ability to empathize with others’
perspectives, and it has been shown that egocentricity tends to be lower
in depressed individuals [24]. Egocentric bias also plays a key factor in
a person’s perception of fairness: people tend to believe that situations
that favor them are fair whereas a similar favor to others is unjust [21, 25].
Perceived fairness is a crucial element in several resource allocation problems.
Most importantly, it has been shown to be ineradicable even after standard
debiasing strategies such as feedback and education [37].
Prior work has been done to model confirmation bias, but the most used
model has been the Bounded Confidence (BC) model. The BC model was
first introduced by Krause in 2000 [36]. Later, Deffuant et al. [13] proposed
a relative agreement model (RA) which extended the BC model. In the BC
model, an agent considers only those opinions that are sufficiently close to
its own, and shuns any opinion outside the confidence threshold. This model
has been used to model confirmation bias in many papers [67, 14, 30, 61, 15].
Self-doubt
There can be multiple responses to a perceived failure—lowering of one’s
aspiration, loss of self-esteem manifested as an increase in doubt, or even
leaving the activity altogether [40].
4
The term self-esteem has been used in three ways—global self-esteem,
state self-esteem and domain specific self-esteem [9]. We are primarily con-
cerned with an agent’s domain-specific self-esteem in this paper, which is a
measure of one’s perceived confidence pertaining to a single domain. Our
work models the self-doubt which is a counterpart of this. Self-doubt is de-
fined as “the state of doubting oneself, a subjective sense of instability in
opinions” [6].
Factions
Factions have been broadly considered to be specific sets of agents. How-
ever, a faction has been modeled in different ways. Some factions have been
modeled as a leader-follower group, where the leader determines the group
dynamics [59]. Even if the group does not have an assigned leader to start
with, it has been suggested that an agent with high cognitive capacity even-
tually emerges as a leader [2]. Such a leader eventually impacts the perfor-
mance of the entire group. Factions can also be modeled as a selfish herd,
where each agent is a member for its own gain [27]. However, this struc-
ture does not have a single leader and such models have proved useful in
modeling certain group behaviors [52, 5].
3 Egocentric Interactions
We consider a system of agents playing a game of iterated interactions. In
each iteration, an agent A is paired with some agent B randomly. Since the
model is based on the Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma (CPD) [66], an agent
can cooperate at any level between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding to defection
and 1 to complete cooperation. CB(t) denotes B’s level of cooperation with
A in interaction t, and this value lies between 0 and 1.
The opinion of A about B at the next interaction t + 1, denoted by
ηA(B, t+ 1) is based on A’s previous ω previous experiences with B, where
ω is the memory size:
ηA(B, t) =
CB(t− 1) +CB(t− 2) + . . . +CB(t− ω)
ω
(1)
A has its own opinion of B and also collects opinions of B from its friends
(described in Section 3.3) as well. It aggregates these opinions according to
its egocentricity, and this aggregate is used as its level of cooperation in the
next interaction with B. If B cooperates at a satisfactory level, A decreases
its doubt on B and thus is more egocentric in the next interaction with B.
These concepts and corresponding formulations are outlined in the following
subsections.
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3.1 Egocentricity
As discussed in the previous section, current models of egocentricity consider
a Bounded Confidence (BC) model and all opinions within this interval get
the same weight [36, 13, 61]. This uniform distribution of weights across
the confidence interval is not an accurate depiction because such a model
would assign the same weight to one’s own opinion and an opinion on the
fringes of the interval. Also, an opinion that is outside the interval by a
mere fraction is to be completely rejected, which is too rigid. This raises the
need for some flexibility, and hence we use a Gaussian (normal) distribution
to calculate the weights. The use of a symmetric distribution to model the
agent’s judgments with egocentric bias is a manifestation of the anchoring-
and-adjustment heuristic, which has a neurological basis [64] and is well
known in studies of the anchoring bias [22, 65]. The same type of distribution
is seen in the context of anchoring bias in the work of Lieder et al. [43]. The
mean of the curve is the agent A’s opinion of the other agent B, as the mean
gets the highest weight in this distribution.
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Figure 1: Weights assigned for a range of opinions
Each agent has a base egocentricity E0, which is a trait of the agent
and remains constant. The egocentricity of an agent A with respect to B
is obtained by factoring the doubt of A about B on A’s base egocentricity.
This egocentricity is manifested as the spread of the Gaussian curve, σ. The
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base spread σ0 is inversely proportional to the base egocentricity:
σ0 =
1
E0
(2)
The higher the egocentricity of an agent, the lower is the spread of the
curve, thus assigning a relatively high weight to its own opinion. The lower
the egocentricity of the agent, the flatter is the curve, thus assigning roughly
the same weight to all opinions including its own. However, this spread
depends on agent B and is an adjusted value of the base spread, σ0.
3.2 Self-Doubt
Literature in psychology suggests several strategies as responses to failure—
quitting, readjusting levels of aspiration, and increasing self-doubt [40]. In
this work, we model an increase in domain-specific self-doubt as the response
to failure, since self-doubt has been claimed to be useful [68]. In response
to a successful interaction, an agent gains in self-confidence, i.e., the self-
doubt is decreased. To classify an interaction as success or failure, A has a
threshold of satisfaction λ; B’s level of cooperation has to be higher than λ
for A to deem the interaction successful.
Self-doubt is used by agent A as a multiplicative factor on the base spread
to obtain the relevant spread for aggregating opinions about agent B. Since
doubt is a multiplicative factor, doubt about all agents is initialized as 1,
and agent A uses σ0 as the spread initially. With subsequent interactions,
doubt varies as described, and this ensures a constantly changing level of
egocentricity, based on outcomes of previous interactions. Since the spread
has to be positive at all times, doubt is lower-bounded by 0. Theoretically
there is no fixed upper bound for doubt, but beyond a certain value, the
curve gets flat enough to a point where all opinions effectively get the same
weight. As doubt tends to zero, the agent is completely certain of its opinion
and rejects all other opinions. Doubt is subjective, and the doubt of A about
B is denoted by DA(B). It is updated after each interaction between A and
B, being incremented or decremented by a constant c depending on whether
A is satisfied or dissatisfied with the interaction.
The spread of the Gaussian curve used for assigning weights to opin-
ions about B is calculated considering the agent-specific doubt and its base
spread, σ0:
σ = σ0DA(B) (3)
This σ defines the spread of the normal distribution used by A to assign
weights to different opinions on B.
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3.3 Social Structures
Though leader-follower models are seen in certain contexts, such as in the
context of modeling countries [58], oligopolies [39], and insurgents [60], there
is evidence that other models with no explicit leader-follower structure are
appropriate to understandmany societal behaviors. The “selfish herd” model [27]
was originally suggested for animals seeking to avoid predation and other
dangers, but it is seen to explain human social behavior as well [51, 52]. Such
models explain economic behavior [53] as well as the evolution of fashions
and cultural changes in society [5]. Social media as well as online purchases
are also best explained in this way [16]. Group decision making in humans
does not follow a strict leader-follower structure even in the presence of
bias [62], and the same is also true when it comes to solving complex prob-
lems by teams [31]. Gill [23] gives the example of Wikipedia as a well-known
example of “collaborative intelligence” at work.
Therefore, we model our agent system as being split into factions, with-
out any single authoritarian faction leader who sets the faction’s view. Rather,
each faction is modeled to be a herd where all members contribute towards
the formation of a central memory, which holds an unbiased aggregate of
member opinions about each agent in the system.
The contribution of all members is assumed to be authentic and complete.
However, the level of adherence of the faction’s view is different for each
agent. Some agents can be modeled as extreme loyalists, who suspend their
own judgment and simply adhere to the faction view, while there are others
who are individualists and do not always conform. We introduce the notion
of faction alignment κ, which is a measure of an agent’s adherence with its
faction, with 0 indicating total nonconformance and 1 complete adherence.
The friends of an agent A are a small subset of the agents in A’s faction.
The number of friends may be different for each agent and friendships are
defined at random when factions are initialized, but remain intact thereafter.
A friendship is the two-way connection between two friends. Based on the
seminal work of Dunbar [17] on the number of friends in primate societies,
a recent paper suggests the concept of Dunbar layers [11]—an individual’s
network is layered according to strength of emotional ties, with there being
four layers in all and the two outermost layers having 30 and 129 members,
which suggests that the average number of friends is about 25% of the overall
social circle. As the number of friends for an individual is variable, as is the
total number of friendships in the faction, we use z2/8 as an upper bound
for the number of friendships within the faction, where z is the faction size.
Friends are the only source of opinions for an agent. Agents fully cooperate
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when they interact with a friend.
3.4 Game Setting
The standard Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is discrete, so each agent can choose
one of only two possible actions: cooperate or defect. However, not all
interactions can be modeled perfectly by such extreme behavior.
In the Continuous Prisoner’s dilemma (CPD) [66, 33], a player can choose
any level of cooperation between 0 and 1. We borrow the concept and the
related payoff equations from Verhoeff’s work on the Trader’s Dilemma [66].
Here, a cooperation level of 0 and 1 correspond to the cases of complete
defection and complete cooperation respectively in the PD.
Consider two agents A and B in a CPD, with their cooperation levels
being a and b respectively. The payoff functions are obtained [66] from the
discrete payoff matrix by linear interpolation:
pA(a, b) = abC + ab¯S + a¯bT + a¯b¯D (4)
where C, T,D, S are the payoffs in the standard PD as shown below
Player B
1 0
Player A
1 (C,C) (S, T )
0 (T, S) (D,D)
The conditions for choosing the values of these variables are 2C > T +S
and that T > C > D > S. Most work on PD, including Axelrod’s seminal
work on evolution of cooperation [3], uses this set of values: 〈C = 3, T =
5,D = 1, S = 0〉, and we do the same.
3.5 Opinion Aggregation
There are three phases in each interaction between two agents A and B:
1. Phase 1 : A adjusts its own opinion ηA(B) and all opinions it has
received from its friends {ηf1(B), ηf2(B), . . .}, with weights represented
by vector W to form an intermediate opinion, O′.
2. Phase 2 : A incorporates MF (B), the faction’s view about B, to the
intermediate opinion O′ using its faction alignment κ as the weight.
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3. Updates: The interaction takes place, payoff ρA is updated, the out-
comes classified according to A’s satisfaction λ, and doubt DA(B) is
updated.
Consider an agent A, which hasm friends 〈f1, f2, . . . fm〉, wishing to form
an informed opinion about another agent B, given its own and its friends’
opinions of B.
Phase 1
As per the definition of opinion in (1), the opinions of B by A and its
friends can be structured as a vector E, given by
E =


ηA(B)
ηf1(B)
ηf2(B)
...
ηfm(B)


(5)
The corresponding weights to each opinion are denoted by the vector W
as,
W =
[
wA wf1 wf2 . . . wfm
]
(6)
Our main problem here is to come up with a W that takes A’s ego-
centricity into account. As described in Section 3.1, we consider a normal
probability distribution for this purpose.
wx =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−(ηx(B)−µ)
2/2σ2 (7)
where µ = ηA(B), σ = σ0 ×DA(B)
So, O′, the opinion at the end of Phase 1, is given by
O′ =W · E (8)
This can also be written in an algebraic form as
O′ = wAηA(B) +
m∑
i=1
wfiηfi(B) (9)
Phase 2
Phase 2 of opinion formation focuses on incorporating the faction’s view
of agent B into the opinion arrived at in phase 1, O′. Let the faction view
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on B be denoted by MF (B) and let κA represent A’s level of alignment
towards its faction. Now, the final opinion about B is a κ-weighted average
of O′ and MF (B)
O = κAMF (B) + (1− κA)O′ (10)
Updates
The updates phase starts off with updating the payoff ρA according to
(4).
ρA = ρA + pA(a, b) (11)
Based on the outcome of this interaction with B (the level of cooperation
b), A updates DA(B), its doubt about B. For A to classify its interaction as
successful, b has to be greater than λ. DA(B) is decremented by a constant
c if the interaction is successful, and it is incremented by c otherwise, as
outlined in Section 3.2.
DA(B) =
{ DA(B) + c, b < λA
DA(B)− c, b > λA (12)
Thus, A aggregates opinions about B received from its friends, taking
into account its level of egocentricity and its doubt about B.
4 Agent Types
An agent pool consisting of three types of agents is considered. The agents
are categorized into different types based on their internal working and at-
tributes. The system is initially configured with attributes such as the total
number of agents, the proportion of different types, the number of factions
in the system, and the number of iterations. In each iteration, an agent is
randomly paired with one other agent, then they interact, and finally, each
agent updates its experiences and payoff. We formally define the various
attributes of an agent before delving into the intricacies of each type.
Basic Attributes
All agent types have four basic attributes as described below:
• α is a unique identifier for each agent, α ∈ {1, . . . , N}, where N is the
number of agents in the system.
• ρ is the agent’s cumulative payoff, a metric to capture the efficiency
or performance, ρ ∈ Z+ ∪ {0}, where Z+ denotes the set of positive
integers.
• ω is the memory size of an agent, ω ∈ Z+.
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• E , the experiences is a two-dimensional vector with N rows and ω
columns. E [i][j] = Ci(t− j), where CX(t) denotes X’s level of cooper-
ation in interaction t.
E =


C1(t− 1) C1(t− 2) . . . C1(t− ω)
C2(t− 1) C2(t− 2) . . . C2(t− ω)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CN (t− 1) CN (t− 2) . . . CN (t− ω)


Extended attributes
Apart from the basic attributes, an agent type may also have several
other attributes that enable their functionality and behavior. We describe
them as follows:
• D represents the self-doubt of an agent. It is a vector indexed by agent
id and reflects the level of uncertainty of the agent’s own opinion about
the corresponding other agent. For agent A, DA = [DA(1),DA(2), ...DA(N)],
0 < DA(j) <∞.
• F is the set of friends of an agent. Friends of an agent A can be
described as a subset of its faction, FA ⊂ Υ (see below).
• σ0 represents the base spread of an agent, as defined in (2), σ0 ∈ R+,
where R+ is the set of positive real numbers.
• λ represents the threshold of satisfaction of an agent, as outlined in
Section 3.5; 0.5 ≤ λ < 1.
• κ represents the faction alignment of an agent; 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1.
4.1 Factions and Friends
A faction is formally defined as a 3-tuple, Ψ = 〈γ,Υ,M〉 where:
• γ is a unique identifier for each faction.
• Υ is the set of member agents.
• M, the central memory is a vector indexed by agent id, and each cell
holds the aggregate of members’ opinions about the corresponding
agent.
12
M =
[∑
k∈Υ
ηk(1,t)
|Υ|
∑
k∈Υ
ηk(2,t)
|Υ| . . .
∑
k∈Υ
ηk(N,t)
|Υ|
]
Each faction is uniquely represented by an identifier and holds a set of
agents with the condition that an agent can belong to one faction only. Each
faction maintains a central memory which indicates past levels of coopera-
tion by all agents in the system (not just the ones in the faction). The
faction’s memory is updated by all members at the end of each interaction,
and is accessible only to its members.
The number of friends are constrained as per the description in Sec-
tion 3.3. Agents always fully cooperate when they interact with their friends.
Any friend can access an agent’s experiences.
4.2 Partisan Agents
A partisan agent Π is formally defined as a 9-tuple as given below. A partisan
agent uses all the extended attributes in addition to the basic attributes.
Π = 〈α, ρ, ω, E ,D,F , σ0, λ, κ〉
Behavior of a partisan agent
Consider that agent A is paired up with agent B in one iteration. The
goal for agent A is to come up with an optimum level of cooperation given
its own prior experiences with B and the opinions it receives from its friends.
The crux of the problem here is to come up with the necessary Gaussian
distribution, defined by µ, σ. Then the opinions are collected, weighed, fac-
tion value incorporated, and then the agent cooperates at this level. The
interaction takes place and then the agent updates the values and learns.
The process is outlined in Algorithm 1, and it can be broken down into four
meaningful steps as described below.
1. Initialization
As discussed already, the curve needs to be centered at the agent’s own
opinion. So, µ is set as A’s opinion of B formed on the basis of its prior
experiences, EA(B). According to (3), σ is set as product of two factors—A’s
base spread (σ0) and A’s doubt on B, DA[B].
Initialize two empty vectors OpinionSet and Weights to capture the
opinions and their respective weights. These vectors correspond to E and
W defined by (5) and (6) respectively. This initialization is shown in lines
1–4 of Algorithm 1.
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2. Collection of opinions and assignment of weights
First append A’s opinion and its weight to OpinionSet and Weights
respectively. This is shown in lines 6–7, where the function Append(l, i)
appends item i to list l. GaussianPDF(x, µ, σ) returns the value of Gaussian
PDF defined by µ and σ at x.
Iterate through the list of A’s friends, and for each friend, extract its
opinion about B and assign the corresponding weight according to (7). Ap-
pend the opinion and the weight to OpinionSet and Weights respectively.
This iteration is captured in the for loop at lines 8–13.
3. Deciding on a final level of cooperation
Perform a dot product on OpinionSet and Weights as per (8) to get the
intermediate decision (O′) based on local opinions (Line 14). A retrieves
its faction’s view on B and stores in FactionView. GetFactionRating(F,X)
returns the faction F ’s view about an agent B. The final level of cooperation
is taken as the alignment-weighted average of O′ and FactionView according
to (10). This calculation is shown in lines 15–17 of Algorithm 1.
4. Updating payoff and doubt
Calculate payoff according to (4) and update A’s payoff (Line 18). Com-
pare B’s level of cooperation b with A’s threshold of satisfaction and update
doubt of A on B according to (12). This condition check is done in lines
19–23 of Algorithm 1. The last line of the algorithm describes the concept
of sharing experiences with its faction and that ends this interaction.
4.3 Individual Trust-Based Agents
An individual trust-based agent Ω is defined by a 5-tuple as given below. It
uses only one extended attribute, λ.
Ω = 〈α, ρ, ω, E , λ〉
The only distinction here is that each cell in experiences (E) stores the
outcomes of the corresponding interaction with that agent. The outcomes
can either be 0 or 1 signifying failure or success. We model the agents with an
attribute called satisfaction (λ) to determine the outcome of an interaction.
There is no communication or sharing of experiences among these agents
and they strictly operate only based on their experiences.
Behavior of an Individual trust-based agent
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Algorithm 1: Behavior of agent A of type Π
/* Initialize µ and σ for Gaussian Distribution */
1 µ ← A.Experience[B];
2 σ ← σ0 ×DA(B);
3 OpinionSet ← ∅ ;
4 Weights ← ∅ ;
5 Friends ← A.Friends ;
6 Append(OpinionSet,A.Experience[B]);
7 Append(Weights,GaussianPDF(A.Experience[B],µ,σ));
/* For each friend, retrieve opinion and weight */
8 for i← Friends do
9 iexp ← i.Experience[B];
10 Append(OpinionSet, iexp);
11 w ← GaussianPDF(iexp,µ,σ);
12 Append(Weights,w);
13 end
/* Perform dot product of OpinionSet and Weights */
14 O’ ← DotProduct(Weights,OpinionSet) ;
15 FactionView ← GetFactionRating(A.factionId,B);
16 FacAlign ← A.falign;
/* LvlCoop represents level of cooperation of A */
17 LvlCoop ← O’× (1− FacAlign) + FactionView× FacAlign;
18 Calculate and update payoff;
19 if b ¿ A.satisfaction then
20 A.Doubt[B] = A.Doubt[B] - c;
21 else
22 A.Doubt[B] = A.Doubt[B] + c;
23 end
24 Share experience with faction;
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Algorithm 2: Behavior of agent A of type Ω
/* A.Experiences[B] is a vector which represents previous
outcomes in interactions with B */
1 LvlCoop ← Average(A.Experiences[B]);
2 Calculate and update payoff;
3 if b ¿ A.satisfaction then
4 Append(A.Experiences[B],1);
5 else
6 Append(A.Experiences[B],0);
7 end
Individual trust-based agents rely on their history of interactions with
other agents as their only source of information to help in decision making.
Consider a case where agent A is paired with agent B in an iteration. A
retrieves the vector corresponding to B from its Experiences vector EA and
calculates an average of values and it cooperates at this level (line 1).
A interacts with B and payoffs are calculated (line 2) and updated ac-
cording to (4). Each agent has an attribute called threshold of satisfaction
and this helps to classify an interaction as success or failure. If agent B
cooperates at a level greater than the threshold of satisfaction (λA), it is
classified a success, and a failure otherwise. In case of success, the corre-
sponding vector is appended with 1 and in case of a failure, it is appended
with 0. This is captured in lines 3–7 of Algorithm 2.
4.4 Suspicious TFT Agents
A Suspicious Tit-for-Tat (S-TFT) Agent ∆ is defined by a 4-tuple and does
not use any extended attribute. The only distinction here is that their
experiences vector can only capture the most recent interaction with that
agent i.e., ω = 1.
∆ = 〈α, ρ, ω, E〉
S-TFT agents are a standard type of agents which have been well ex-
plored in IPD games [3, 8]. As the name suggests, an S-TFT agent A
defects completely on its first interaction with B owing to its “suspicious”
nature. However, in subsequent iterations, A cooperates at the same level
that B has cooperated in the previous interaction.
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5 Experiments and Results
The agent pool is configured with all its parameters as described in Section 4
and in each iteration, an agent is paired randomly with one other agent. At
the end of an interaction, payoffs and experiences are updated. Agents
capable of learning modify their self-doubt based on the outcome. This flow
is outlined by Figure 2. We vary several parameters in the configuration
of model and individual agents’ attributes such as egocentricity to observe
their effects on performance. The findings are presented in the following
subsections.
Figure 2: Workflow for system
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5.1 The Importance of Egocentricity
To observe the impact of different degrees of egocentricity, we considered a
system of 500 agents equally distributed among all 3 types. We consider 5
factions in the system and vary the value of base egocentricity (E0). We
find that payoffs are highest for an intermediate level of egocentricity and is
not as good for both extremely high values and extremely low values. Our
results concur with the conventional wisdom that egocentricity has to be at
a moderate level for better gains (Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Effect of egocentricity on payoffs
5.2 Comparing Payoffs of All Agent Types
To understand the payoffs for each type and to see how they fare against
others, the system’s total number of agents is varied along with the number
of factions, in such a way that each faction holds about the same number
of agents. This is done to avoid any variations resulting from changes in
faction size. We increase the number of agents in the system from 50 all
the way up to 500. Figure 4 clearly indicates that partisan agents always
perform better than the other types.
18
 0
 5000
 10000
 15000
 20000
 25000
 30000
 35000
 40000
 45000
 50000
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Av
er
ag
e 
pa
yo
ff 
pe
r a
ge
nt
Number of agents in system (N)
S-TFT
IndivTrust
Partisan
Figure 4: Comparing all types of agents
5.3 Proportion of Partisan Agents
To see if partisan agents perform better at all levels of representation in the
system, we vary the proportion of partisan agents in a system of 200 agents
with 5 factions. Since we are keeping the total number of agents and the
number of factions constant and increasing the representation of partisan
agents, factions contain on average a higher number of partisan agents, and
hence their payoffs are expected to be higher, as seen in Figure 5.
5.4 Effect of Faction Size
To understand the effect of faction sizes on payoffs, we consider a system of
1300 agents with half of them partisan agents and the rest equally distributed
among the other types. We consider 10 factions in the system with sizes
ranging from 10 to 225. As the faction size increases, the average payoff per
partisan agent also increases and this is seen in Figure 6. (Payoffs for other
agent types do not depend on faction sizes, for obvious reasons.)
Network externality can be described as a change in the benefit, or sur-
plus, that an agent derives from a good when the number of other agents
consuming the same kind of good changes [42]. Over the years, various
network pioneers have attempted to model how the growth of a network
increases its value. One such model is Sarnoff’s Law which states that value
is directly proportional to size [35] (an accurate description of broadcast net-
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works with a few central nodes broadcasting to many marginal nodes such
as TV and radio).
Since each of our factions has one central memory that caters to all
members, it is similar to broadcast networks and Figure 6 exhibits a similar
proportionality (with a large offset).
 129000
 130000
 131000
 132000
 133000
 134000
 135000
 136000
 137000
 138000
10 15 25 50 75 100 150 225
Av
er
ag
e 
pa
yo
ff 
pe
r a
ge
nt
Faction size
Figure 6: Effect of faction sizes on payoffs of partisan agents
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5.5 Number of Interactions and Payoffs
The number of interactions is a crucial aspect when it comes to comparing
strategies because S-TFT agents may gain a lot in their first interaction
with other agents, and if there are no subsequent interactions with the same
agents, it is highly profitable for them. However, partisan agents grow better
with each interaction because of the availability of more information. We
consider a system of 500 agents equally distributed among all 3 types and
vary the number of interactions per agent. As expected, S-TFT agents have
their best payoffs for lower numbers of interactions, but their payoffs start
to fall rapidly with increasing interactions. Partisan agents steadily receive
better payoffs as the number of interactions increases (Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Number of interactions and payoffs
5.6 Number of Factions and Payoffs
For partisan agents, the number of factions in the system plays a vital role.
When there are many factions in the system, agents are scattered across
factions, thus weakening each faction by reducing the information contained
in the faction’s central memory. Hence, we expect payoffs to decrease as
number of factions are increased. We have considered a system of 200 agents
equally distributed among types and vary the number of factions from 10 to
100. It is clear from the Figure 8, that when factions are fewer in number,
partisan agents achieve high payoffs, but as the number of factions increase,
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the advantage of a faction is diluted and the payoff decreases.
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Figure 8: Number of factions and payoffs of partisan agents
6 Conclusions
We live in a deeply fragmented society where differences of opinion are some-
times so high that communication may break down in some instances. A
clear model of various biases is important to understand the underlying
mechanics of how some hold opinions that may seem irrational to others.
We present a model that closely captures the reality by imbibing the
agents with egocentric bias and doubt. We use a symmetric distribution
centered at an agent’s own opinion to assign weights to various opinions
and thus introduce more flexibility than previous models. We also model a
response to failure, by altering the self-doubt on that topic. This balance
between egocentricity and doubt enables the agent to learn reactively.
Opinion aggregation from multiple sources is now more important than
ever owing to the effects of social media and mass communication. Hence,
there is a need for appropriate models that realistically capture the way
humans form opinions. Group opinion dynamics continue to be an area of
immense interest and hence we have also introduced a model of a faction
with a central memory. We observe that our model of factions seems to
support the theory of network effects, and to be consistent with Sarnoff’s
22
Law.
In people, high egocentricity may be connected with anxiety or overcon-
fidence, and low egocentricity with depression or feelings of low self-worth.
Our results also support the notion that egocentricity needs to be moderate
and that either extreme is not as beneficial.
It is also observed that partisan agents generally perform much better
than the other types that have been considered, which too seems to have
parallels in human society.
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